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Abstract
In 1988, Ivlev proposed four-valued non-deterministic semantics for modal logics in which the alethic
(T) axiom holds good. Unfortunately, no completeness was proved. In previous work, we proved
completeness for some Ivlev systems and extended his hierarchy, proposing weaker six-valued systems
in which the (T) axiom was replaced by the deontic (D) axiom. Here, we eliminate both axioms,
proposing even weaker systems with eight values. Besides, we prove completeness for those new
systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary (deterministic) logical matrices
would be possible for all those systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not
characterize any of them.
Keywords: Propositional modal logic, non-deterministic semantics, finite matrices, recovery
operators.
Introduction
Non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices) is an useful alternative in order to give a satisfactory
semantic account of certain logics that are not characterizable by finite deterministic matrices.
In deterministic matrices, the truth-value of a complex formula is uniquely determined by the
truth-values of its subformulas by means of truth-funcions. In a non-deterministic matrix, the
truth-value of a complex formula can be chosen non-deterministically out of some non-empty
set of options1.
It is worth noting that most part of standard modal systems can not be characterizable
by finite deterministic matrices.2 Taking this into account, it is natural to think if finite non-
deterministic matrices can be considered as a useful approach to modal logic. Actually, Ivlev
1Acording to [2].
2In fact, Dugundji proved in [15] this result for Lewis’ hierarchy S1-S5, but this result can be easily extended
to most part of standard modal systems. See [10].
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had proposed in the eighties a semantics of four-valued Nmatrices3 for implication and modal
operators, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without necessitation rule4.
Ivlev assumed that everything that is necessarily true is actually true. In order to considerate
systems without this assumption, we extended Ivlev’s hiearchy5, by adding two new truth-
values. In section 1, we will discuss how those four and six truth-values could be interpreted
in terms of modal concepts. In the first case, we will offer an alethic perspective; in the second
one, we will suggest a deontic interpretation.
In a deontic context, we assume that what is necessarily (or obliged) is, at least, possible (or
permitted). In this paper, we will propose weaker systems in which this principle does not hold.
So, we can have modal contradictory situations, that means, propositions that are necessarily
true but impossible. This requires eight truth-values. We will offer an epistemic interpretation
of them in Section 1.
In Section 2, we will argue why non-deterministic implication and modal operators are
required considering how modal concepts work in the natural language. We will start with four
values, going towards six and eight values. After that, we will prove in Section 4.12 completeness
for some modal systems with eight truth-values.
Non-deterministic propositional modal logics presented here clearly constitute a hierarchy.
The point here, as shown in Section 5, it is not only that one system is included in another
one. Moreover, it will be shown that any system of the hierarchy can recover all the inferences
of the stronger ones by means of Derivability Adjustment Theorems.
In Ivlev’s semantics, four kinds of implications are considered: those who have three, two,
one or zero cases of non-determinism. However, no completeness result is presented. In another
work, we proved completeness for some systems whose implication has three cases of non-
determinism6. In section 6, we will prove completeness with respect to deterministic Ivlev’s
implication, showing some relation between this modal systems, four-valued Go¨del logic, four-
valued  Lukasiewicz logic and Monteiro-Baaz’s ∆ operator.
It is also natural to ask whether the use of finite non-deterministic matrices is essential
for dealing with those hierarchies, or if a characterization by finite ordinary deterministic ma-
trices would be possible. In section 7, we will show that finite deterministic matrices do not
characterize any of these systems that are complete with respect to finite Nmatrices.
1 Interpreting modal concepts as truth-values
Consider the modal concepts of necessarily true, possibly true and actually true. Their nega-
tions are necessarily false (or impossible), possibly false and actually false, respectively. If we
consider contingent as being, at the same time, possible true and possible false, this permits us
to define eight truth-values:
T+: necessarily, possibly and actually true;
C+: contingently and actually true;
F+: impossible, possibly false but actually true;
I+: necessary true, impossible and actually true;
3Ivlev called them quasi-matrices. See [19].
4Necessitation Rule is a rule that infers, from a given theorem, that it is necessarily a theorem. Namely: if
⊢ α then ⊢ α.
5See in [6]
6In [6], we proved those completeness using Ivlev’s rule (DN). This rule, unfortunately, is not semantically
sound, as it was remarked and fixed in [30]. In [7], we replaced the rule by the axioms (DN1) and (DN2), also
fixing the problem.
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T−: necessarily and possibly true but actually false;
C−: contingently and actually false;
F−: impossible, possibly false and actually false;
I−: necessarily true, impossible and actually false.7
In order to better understand the meaning of those truth-values, we can, first of all, grouping
them into two subsets:
+ = {T+, C+, F+, I+} (actually true);
− = {T−, C−, F−, I−} (actually false).
When a proposition receives a truth-value in +, we understand that it is actually or factually
the case or, in Kripkean terms, it is true “in the real world”. Otherwise, it receives a truth-
value in −; in that case, we interpret that the proposition is not actually or factually the case,
or it is false “in the real world”. The truth-values in “actually true” are designated but the
truth-values in “actually false” are not. All the modal systems here considered are extensions
of Propositional Classical Logic - PC. That means: all the tautologies are actually true and all
the contradictions are actually false.
Kripke semantics for propositional modal logic also respects classical truth-tables, but there
are models when the accessibility relation is empty in which all the formulas are necessarily true
but also impossible8. Analogously, the values I+ and I− expresses those modal contradictory
scenarios.
Kripke argues that9 his semantics, differently from Kant, distinguishes the concepts of
necessary and a priori. In fact, for Kant, sentences (or “judges”, in Kantian terms) are necessary
if and only if we can think of them a priori, that is, not empirically10. But Kripke claims that
“necessary” has a metaphysical meaning captured by his semantics: something is necessarily
true if and only if it is true in all possible worlds. Therefore, in Kripkean terms, we can know
something empirically that is true in all the possible worlds, and so, that would be necessary a
posteriori. Reciprocally, we can know something a priori but there could be a world in which
that would be false, so it would be contingent a priori.
The non-deterministic semantics proposed in the present paper, in turn, intends to recuper-
ate the identification between being necessary and being a priori that most part of philosophers
does, as even Kripke admits. In fact, this identification is not only in accordance with Kant’s
7These truth-values can be formalized in a modal language (assuming, as usual, the equivalences ¬p ≡ ♦¬p
and ¬♦p ≡ ¬p) as follows: T+: p ∧ ♦p ∧ p; C+: ¬p ∧ ♦p ∧ p; F+: ¬p ∧ ♦¬p ∧ p; I+: p ∧ ¬♦p ∧ p; T−:
p∧♦p∧¬p; C−: ¬p∧♦p∧¬p; F−: ¬p∧♦¬p∧¬p; I−: p∧¬♦p∧¬p. Modal languages will be discussed
in Section 2.
8Those models were not, in fact, proposed by Kripke according to [11, p. 49]. Actually, Kripke assumes
in [22] that the accessibility relation for normal system is, at least, reflexive. Segerberg proposes an equivalent
axiomatic in 1971, defending that, against “followers of Kripke’s terminology”, normal modal logics should cover
those models whose the accessibility relation is empty, see [33, p. 12].
9 In [24, p. 34].
10In the first reading of Critique of Pure Reason, the reciprocate does not seem to be true. Indeed, a judge
is a priori if and only if it is necessarily or strictly universal. But necessity and strictly universality belong
together inseparably [20, (B2-B3)]. Finally, Kant affirms in Prolegomena that necessity and cognition taken for
a priori are the same [21, (4:277)] .
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point of view. A correlation between the notions of being necessary and being a priori is found
in others important philosophers, for instance, Descartes11 and more contemporary, Russell12.
To endorse that perspective, the eight values should be grouped as follows:
T = {T+, T−} ( a priori true)
C = {C+, C−} ( a posteriori true or false)
F = {F+, F−} ( a priori false)
I = {I+, I−} (a priori true and false )
In conceptual terms, let A, N and P represent the concepts of actual, necessary and possible,
respectively. The Venn-diagram below shows the relationship between the truth-values and
those concepts:
A N
P
T+
T−C+
I−I
+
F+
C−
F−
The values I+ and I− do represent very artificial situations. In fact, it is quite reasonable
to admit, for example, that mathematical knowledge is always a priori13. Assuming this, these
modally contradictory scenarios would express that mathematics would be inconsistent. It is
11Descartes does not use the term a priori in his Meditations on First Philosophy, see [14]. However, he
separates the study of composite things, like medicine and physics, from simpler things, like geometry and
arithmetic (AT 20). Gueroult, a Descartes’ commentator, arguments that, on First Meditation, Descartes
presents some natural reasons to doubt about the composite things, instead of the simpler ones, since they are
the necessary conditions of all possible representations, that is, for those things that exist in nature, see [17,
p. 17]. Those simpler things are intuited “with the eye of the mind” (AT 36). Besides, mathematical truths
are “the most certain of all” (AT 65) and in mathematics there is “true and certain knowledge of it [scientia]”
(AT 70). The Cartesian characterizations of arithmetic and geometry knowledge is very near to the Kantian
notion of a priori. Because of those things clearly and distinctly intuited are necessarily true (AT 70), we can
infer that Descartes defends, agreeing with Kant, that a priority and necessity are attached concepts. This
approximation must be done, of course, with some caveats. For instance, both philosophers could disagree with
respect to the role of the imagination in a priori knowledge, compare, in particular, Meditations (AT 72-73)
and Critique (B 103-104).
12In [31, p. 64-65], Russell defends that the term necessary should not be applied to propositions as ordinary
traditional philosophy does; instead it should be applied to propositional functions: if a propositional function
is always true, it is necessary true (for ex. “if x is a man, x is mortal”), if it is sometimes true, it is possible (for
ex. “x is a men”) and if it is never true, it is impossible (for ex. “x is a unicorn”). Further [31, p. 75], he says
that we know logical propositions a priori and one of his examples is the sentence “If all a’s are b’s and x is an
a, then x is a b”. That means that we know a priori all logical theorems. For soundness, any logical theorem
is always true. In other words, what we know a priori is necessarily true.
13Kant clearly claims that in Critique (B4-B5) and in Prolegomena (4:280), but similar thesis can be found in
other important philosophers. Descartes doubts of all mathematical certainties througout the fiction of the Evil
Genius, but this doubt is, as Gueroult stresses in [17, p. 20-22], methodological, metaphysical and hyperbolic.
Once it is guaranteed that God could not deceive us, it is impossible to doubt of mathematical truth, unless
obvious contradictions (AT 36). Russell seems agreeing with that mathematical knowlege is a priori. Indeed,
it would be contradictory if some mathematical theorem would be false. According to [13], Russell’s logicism
consists in admit that logic and mathematics are both synthetic a priori and, as argued in note 12, all logical
theorems are, for Russell, known a priori.
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hard to believe that most part of philosophers and mathematician would defend it. Anyway,
non-deterministic modal semantics could express even those extreme situations.
It is more plausible to admit that our a priori knowledge is always consistent. As it will be
shown, it is equivalent to admit that what is necessary is possible. In other words, we can not
have propositions that are, at same time, a priori true and false .
That assumption forces a new relationship between the concepts of necessary and possible.
Indeed, the concept of necessary will be included in the concept of possible, as expressed by
the Venn-diagram below:
A
N P
F+ C+ T+ T− C−
F−
In alethic contexts, it seems reasonable to admit that an a priori judge can not be falsified
by experience. In that sense, what is necessarily true is aways actually true.14 In other words,
it is hard to accept that something actually true could be impossible.
But alethic interpretation is not the one that makes more sense in a configuration with six
truth-values. Since what is obligatory is, in general, permitted, we could use the same dia-
gram below in order to represent the relationship between the concepts of obligatory, permitted
and actual. They are represented above by the sets N, P and A, respectively. In a deontic
perspective, the values should be interpreted as follows:
T+: Obligatory and actually true
C+: Permitted and actually true
F+: Forbidden but actually true (infringed)
T−: Obligatory but actually false (infringed)
C−: Permitted and actually false
F−: Forbidden and actually false
In deontic logics, it makes no sense to consider that what is obligatory is actually the case.
Indeed, there are laws but sometimes people do not respect them, and the law is infringed.
If we come back to an alethic perspective, we could add the principle that what is a priori
true is, indeed, actually true. Thus, what is necessary would be actual and what is actual would
be possible.15
Let again A, N and P represent the concepts of actual, necessary and possible, respectively.
The Venn-diagram that represents both inclusion clauses is equivalent to that one:
14It is easy to check that Kant respects that principle: according to him, anyone that is in an a priori domain
can not be refuted through experience (B8). Considering that necessity implies a priori and considering that,
according to our interpretation of modal truth-values, what is actually true is true through experience, that is,
a posteriori ; we can conclude then that it would be contradictory to admit that a sentence would be necessarily
true and actually false, since this sentence would be, at the same time, a priori and a posteriori, what is an
absurd. Kripke explicitly agrees with this principle (see [24, p. 36]), even though his semantics forces that the
relation between the possible worlds is reflexive in order to validate it. Both normal and non-normal modal
logics, in Kripkean terms, respects this principle. For more technical results, see [22] and [23].
15This is essentially the meaning of the modal axiom (T), namely: p→ p and p→ ♦p.
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A
P
N
T+ C+ C−
F−
Since necessity entails actuality, the values T− and F− must be eliminated. The four values
would be now interpreted as follows:
T+: necessarily true (or a priori true)
C+: contingently true (or a posteriori true )
C−: contingently false (or a posteriori false )
F−: necessarily false / impossible (or a priori false )
But if necessity implies actuality and if actuality implies possibility, we could have, in
fact, only two concepts: actual and contingent. Let us represent them by the sets A and C,
respectively. The Venn-diagram below with only those two concepts corresponds to the last
one above:
A C
T+ C+ C−
F−
We are not claiming here that non-deterministic semantics is the correct way to formulate
Kant’s logic. But in the same way that there is an approximation between the Leibnizian
notion of “the best of possible worlds” and relational semantics16, Ivlev’s semantics can be
seen as an approximation between the notion of necessary and a priori, according to a Kantian
perspective.
2 Some interpretations of logical operators
Let us consider an extension of propositional language based on ¬ and →, adding  and ♦ as
unary connectives.17 In classical propositional logic, truth-tables are a formal semantics used
in order to interpret the linguistic notions of “deny” and “implies”. Modal propositional logic
normally extends it, intending to capture the linguistic notion of “necessary” and “possible”
through the symbol  and ♦, respectively.
16According to Noonan, Kripke semantics “brought back into the philosophical mainstream the Leibnizian
language according to which necessity is truth in all possible worlds and possibility is truth in some.”, see [29],
p. 8.
17We could use  as the only modal operator, defining ♦ ≡def ¬¬. Reciprocally, we could use ♦ as the
only modal operator, defining  ≡def ¬♦¬. We will consider both as the primitive modal connectives in order
to facilitate the readability of modal axioms.
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As usually modal logic are considered as an extension of PC, it is expected that formulas
that are tautologies inPC should continue being true in any modal semantics. If we are thinking
on modal-truth value terms, theorems in PC should always receive a designated truth-value.
At this point, it is convenient to recall the notion of Nmatrix semantics introduced by
A. Avron and I. Lev. If Σ is a propositional signature, then For(Σ) will denote the algebra of
formulas freely generated by Σ from a given denumerable set V = {p1, p2, . . .} of propositional
variables.
Definition 2.1. Let Σ be a propositional signature. A multialgebra (a.k.a. hyperalgebra or
non-deterministic algebra) over Σ is a pair A = (A, σA) such that A is a nonempty set (the
domain of A) and σA is a function assigning, to each n-ary connective c in Σ, a function (called
multioperation or hyperoperation) cA : An → ℘(A)− {∅}.
Definition 2.2 (See [1]). Let M = (A, D) be an Nmatrix over a signature Σ. A valuation
over M is a function v : For(Σ) → A such that, for every n-ary connective c in Σ and every
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ For(Σ):
v(c(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) ∈ c
A(v(ϕ1), . . . , v(ϕn)).
Definition 2.3 (See [1]). LetM = (A, D) be an Nmatrix over a signature Σ, and let Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆
For(Σ). We say that ϕ is a consequence of Γ in the Nmatrix M, denoted by Γ |=M ϕ, if the
following holds: for every valuation v over M, if v[Γ] ⊆ D then v(ϕ) ∈ D. In particular, ϕ is
valid in M, denoted by |=M ϕ, if v(ϕ) ∈ D for every valuation v over M.
From now on the multioperator associated by a multialgebra A = (A, σA) to a given con-
nective c will be simply denoted by c, when there is no risk of confusion.
Let us consider, for now, four-valued modal scenarios as described in the last section. Let
Σ be the modal signature containing the connectives ¬ (negation),  (necessary) and → (im-
plication), and let For be the set of formulas generated by Σ from V. Consider the following:
+ = {T+, C+} (designated values)
− = {C−, F−} (non-designated values)
In order to extend classical propositional semantics, a four-valued Nmatrix with domain
{T+, C+, C−, F−} will be defined. The multioperators associated to the classical connectives
¬ and → of signature Σ must respect, at least, the following conditions:
¬
T+ −
C+ −
C− +
C− +
→ T+ C+ C− F−
T+ + + − −
C+ + + − −
C− + + + +
C− + + + +
But those restrictions seem to be very week . Take, for instance, just the multioperator for
negation. Consider the sentence:
(S1) “2 plus 2 is equal to 4”
It is clear that (S1) is true. Indeed, it seems not be a posteriori true, but a priori true. It is
natural to attribute to (S1) the value T
+. Consider now the sentence:
(S2) “it is not the case that 2 plus 2 is not equal to 4”
2 Some interpretations of logical operators 8
It is quite reasonable to admit that if (S1) is a priori true, then (S2) would be also a priori
true. If we accept, however, the table above, we can have the following situation:
p ¬p ¬¬p
T+
T+ C− C+
T+
F− C+
So, despite (S1) being a priori true, (S2) could be a posteriori true (the two rows ending
with C+), which would be weird. In order to fix that problem, we must force that the negation
of a priori true is a priori false. If we accept this, the same argument can be applied to the
other values and we would have the following deterministic operator for negation:
¬
T+ {F−}
C+ {C−}
C− {C+}
F− {T+}
The argument for constraining the multioperator for implication displayed above is a bit
more complex. Take, for instance, two propositions:
(S3) 2 = 1 + 1
(S4) 1 + 1 = 2
It is clear that (S3) and (S4) are both a priori true. So, it makes sense to consider that
“(S3) implies (S4)” will be also a priori true. Consider now the sentence:
(S5) 1 + 1 = 3
It is clear that (S5) is impossible or, in other words, it is a priori false. This forces that (S4)
implies (S5) will be impossible, that is, the implication as a whole must be a priori false too.
On the other hand, things are not so simple for contingent situations. Take, for instance,
two contingent true sentences:
(S6) “Barack Obama is 1.85m height”
(S7) “Barack Obama has short hair”
Since both (S6) and (S7) are contingently true, it is expected that “(S6) implies (S7)” is only
contingently true, that means, a posteriori true. But take account now the sentence:
(S8) “Barack Obama is more than 1.80m height”
In this situation, “(S6) implies (S8)” is not only contingently true but necessarily either.
That is, “(S6) implies (S8)” should be a priori true. In order to capture this non-deterministic
scenario, we will say that the function “implies” attributes to the par of values 〈C+, C+〉 the
set +.
Consider now the sentence:
(S9) “Barack Obama has not short hair”
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It is false, but only contingently. It is clear that both “(S6) implies (S9)” and “(S7) implies
(S9)” will be aways actually false. It makes sense that “(S6) implies (S9)” is contingently false.
However, someone would say that “(S7) implies (S9)” must be impossible. In fact, how could
be possible Obama have and not have short hair? It makes sense, thus, to consider that “(S7)
does not implies (S9)” is a tautology. So, “(S7) implies (S9)” should be impossible if we consider
the principle that tautologies are always necessarily true. That is what happens in Kripkean
normal modal logics.
Abolishing this rule, we can argue that if “(S7) implies (S9)” would be a priori false, then
(S7) would be a priori true and that is absurd, because (S7) is contingent. Therefore, the
multioperator → must always attribute to the ordered pair of values 〈C+, C−〉 the singleton
{C−}.
The point here is that a tautology is something that is always true for any valuation instead
of “true in all possible world”. So “(S7) implies (S9)” will receive as a set of values always
a subset of designated-values, that is, a value in {T+, C+}. But the notion here of necessary
and possible is not a logical one, but an epistemic one. As (S7) is only empirically true and
(S9) is empirically false, “(S7) implies (S9)” will be empirically false from an epistemic point of
view. In particular, if (S9) is the negation of (S7), thus “(S7) implies (S9)” will be always false,
because it is a contradiction, that means, it will receive as value always a subset of −. But this
has nothing to do with the epistemic value of the complex sentence.18
We can find analogous arguments in order to justify the table below:
→ T+ C+ C− F−
T+ {T+} {C+} {C−} {F−}
C+ {T+} + {C−} {C−}
C− {T+} + + {C−}
F− {T+} {T+} {T+ {T+}
Finally, the multioperator assigned to  must capture the notion of necessary in natural
language, while the multioperator for ♦ must capture the notion of possible. Thus, consider
the sentence:
(S10) “Barack Obama is mortal”
If (S10) is necessarily true, then the sentence
(S11) “Barack Obama is necessarily mortal”
is actually true. But is (S11) contingently or necessarily true? At first, no modal semantics
need to compromise with the principle that what is necessary is also necessarily necessary.
Reciprocally, if (S10) is not necessarily true, then (S11) is actually false. But should be (S11)
only contingently false or impossible? At first, no commitment is assured. If we assume that
what is necessarily true is impossible to be false, this leads us to the following multioperators:
 ♦
T+ + +
C+ − +
C− − +
F− − −
18Kripke says: “The terms ‘necessarily’ and ‘a priori ’ as applied to statements, are not obvious synonyms.
There may be a philosophical argument connecting then, perhaps even identifying them; but an argument is
required, not the simple observation that the two terms are clearly interchangeable” [24, p. 38]. Analogously,
we could sustain that is not obvious that all the tautologies are necessarily true. A philosophical argument is
required.
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Let α and β be formulas of the modal language For. The multioperator ♦ was obtained
from  and ¬ by interpreting, as usual, ♦α = ¬¬α. Observe that, by taking the usual notion
of composition of multioperators in multialgebras,
♦x =
⋃
{¬z : z ∈ ¬x}
where ¬x =
⋃
{y : y ∈ ¬x} (see for instance [8]).
From the axiomatic point of view, we add to any Hilbert calculus for classical propositional
logic PC over the signature {¬,→} (assuming that Modus Ponens, MP, is the only inference
rule) the following axiom schemas:
(K) (α→ β)→ (α→ β)
(K1) (α→ β)→ (♦α→ ♦β)
(K2) ♦(α→ β)→ (α→ ♦β)
(M1) ¬♦α→ (α→ β)
(M2) β → (α→ β)
(M3) ♦β → ♦(α→ β)
(M4) ♦¬α→ ♦(α→ β)
(T) α→ α
(DN1) α→ ¬¬α
(DN2) ¬¬α→ α
The Hilbert calculus composed by these axiom schemas (and havingMP as the only inference
rule) is sound and complete with respect to the four-valued Nmatrix presented above, and it is
called Tm (see [6, 7]).
Let now assume the principle that what is necessary is also necessarily necessary. In order
to do this, and keeping the multioperators for negation and implication, we slightly modify the
multioperator for  (and hence the one for ♦) as follows:
 ♦
T+ {T+} +
C+ − +
C− − +
F− − {F−}
From the axiomatic point of view, we add the axiom schema:
(4) α→ α
The system obtained is T4m, and it is sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding four-
valued Nmatrix (see [6, 7]).
We could assume, reciprocally, that what is not necessary is impossible to be necessary.
That forces us to assume deterministic operators for the modal connectives:
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 ♦
T+ {T+} {T+}
C+ {F−} {T+}
C− {F−} {T+}
F− {F−} {F−}
Consider now the system obtained from T4m by adding the following axiom schema:
(5) ♦α → α
The resulting system, called T45m, is sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding four-
valued Nmatrix (see [6, 7]).19
3 Interpreting modal operators in a deontic context
We might ask what would happen with those Nmatrices if we abandon the principle that what
is a priori true is actually true. From an axiomatic point of view, we can weaken (T), replacing
it by the following axiom schema:
(D) α→ ♦α
This system was called Dm in [6, 7]. From a semantic point of view, we will have six
truth-values, as discussed in Section 1.
In a deontic scenario, it is quite natural to expect the same behavior that tautologies had in
a alethic scenario. That is, all propositional tautologies will always receive a designated value.
In this setting, the designed values are:
+ = {T+, C+, F+} (designated values)
− = {T−, C−, F−} (non-designated values)
By reasoning as in the last section, the following deterministic operator for negation should
be accepted:
¬
T+ {T−}
C+ {C−}
F+ {F−}
T− {F+}
C− {C+}
F− {T+}
Clearly, if the sentence
(S12) Drive safely
is obliged, thus “Do not drive safely” will be forbidden and so on. The multioperator for
implication is not quite obvious, as it can be seen below:
19The systems Tm and T45m are originally called Sa+ and Sb+, respectively. See [19].
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→ T+ C+ F+ T− C− F−
T+ {T+} {C+} {F+} {T−} {C−} {F−}
C+ {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {T−} {T−, C−} {C−}
F+ {T+} {T+} {T+} {T−} {T−} {T−}
T− {T+} {C+} {F+} {T+} {C+} {F+}
C− {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {T+} {T+, C+} {C+}
F− {T+} {T+} {T+} {T+} {T+} {T+}
However, we have three arguments in order to defend the relevance of that multioperator.
First, from a semantic point of view, by considering the Nmatrix formed by the negation
operator and the multioperator for → introduced above, together with some quite natural
multioperators for  and ♦ (to be introduced below), were + is the set of designated values, we
obtain a sound and complete Nmatrix deontic semantic for Dm. Secondly, from an axiomatic
point of view, the difference between Dm and Tm is analogous to the one between the Kripkean
systems T and D, in which the relation between the possible worlds is reflexive and serial,
respectively.20 Third, eliminating the new values T− and F+, we have exactly the Nmatrix for
Tm. As we shall see in Section 5, this implies that the multialgebra underlying the Nmatrix
for Tm is a submultialgebra of that for Dm.
Somebody could ask the linguistic justification in order to add a new case of non-determinism:
when an antecedent is permitted and true and the consequence is permitted and false. For that,
consider the sentences
(S13) John takes Peter’s sheep.
(S14) John smokes a cigarette.
(S15) John pays for Peter’s sheep.
All those sentences are clearly permitted. Suppose that John smokes a cigarette, takes Peter’s
sheep but doesn’t pay him for it. It is clear that “(S14) implies (S15)” is permitted while
“(S13) implies (S15)” is an infraction. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the multioperator →
attributes in a deontic context to the ordered pair of values 〈C+, C−〉 the set of value {T−, C−}.
Two extension of Dm were considered in [6, 7]. If we force that obligations are always
obligatory, we add the schema axiom (4) to Dm, obtaining the system D4m. Reciprocally, if
we accept too that what is not obligatory is not permitted being obligatory, we add the schema
axiom (5) to D4m, obtaining D45m.
Analogously to the alethic context, the semantic difference between Dm, D4m and D45m
is only with respect to modal operators  and ♦:
Dm D4m D45m
 ♦  ♦  ♦
T+ + + {T+} + {T+} {T+}
C+ − + − + {F−} {T+}
F+ − − − {F−} {F−} {F−}
T− + + {T+} + {F−} {T+}
C− − + − + {F−} {T+}
F− − − − {F−} {F−} {F−}
20The system T is characterized by the axiom (T), the necessitation rule and the axiom (K). The completenes
result forT was first proved by Kripke in [22]. Axiomatics forD was proposed by Lemmon in [25], where he called
it T(D). We follow Segerberg’s nomenclature in [33, p. 47]. Kripke did not originally proove D-completeness
with respect to his semantics, this result is for the first time proved in [33, p. 47-50] .
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The resulting Nmatrices are sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding Hilbert calculi
(see [6, 7]).
4 Some 8-valued modal systems
The next natural step would be trying to extend the proposed analogy between Kripke semantics
and modal Nmatrices. In Kripke semantics, in order to characterize the system D, the relation
between the possible worlds must be serial; by eliminating the axiom (D) it is obtained the
basic system K, in which the relation between the possible worlds is empty. By recalling our
analysis in Section 1 with respect to eight truth-values, and by considering the possibility of
adding to K the axioms (4) and (5), Ivlev-like non-normal modal systems can be obtained,
namely Km, K4m and K45m, respectively. It could be natural to consider, in our framework,
the following multioperators for negation and the modalities:21
Km K4m K45m
¬  ♦  ♦  ♦
T+ {F−} + + {T+, I+} + {T+, I+} {T+, I+}
C+ {C−} − + − + {F−, I−} {T+, I+}
F+ {T−} − − − {F−, I−} {F−, I−} {F−, I−}
I+ {I−} + − {T+, I+} {F−, I−} {T+I+} {F−, I−}
T− {F+} + + {T+, I+} + {T+, I+} {T+, I+}
C− {C+} − + − + {F−, I−} {T+, I+}
F− {T+} − − − {F−, I−} {F−, I−} {F−, I−}
I− {I+} + − {T+, I+} {F−, I−} {T+, I+} {F−, I−}
From the axiomatic point of view, it is also expected that, by eliminating the axiom (D)
in Km, we can provide a sound and complete system coherent w.r.t. the multioperators for 
and ♦ above. This is not the case, at it will be shown below:
Example 4.1. Let v be a valuation function over the proposed Nmatrix for Km, that is, in
which the multioperators for ¬ and  are as displayed above. Let S be any modal system that
extends PC and derives the axioms (M1) and (K). Suppose that v(p) = {I+} and v(q) = {C+}
for two given propositional variables p and q. Thus, by the ¬-multioperator, v(¬p) = {I−}.
In addition, by the -multioperator for Km, v(¬p) ∈ + and, by (M1) and the fact that S
extends PC, we would have that v((p→ q)) ∈ +. On the other hand, by the -multioperator
for Km once again, we would have that v(p) ∈ + and v(q) ∈ −. Since S extends PC, we
would have that v((p→ q)→ (p→ q)) ∈ −, falsifying axiom (K).
At this point, there are two possible ways to go: a syntactical (axiomatic) one and a
semantical one. The axiomatic one is to abandon either (K) or (M1) or both in order to
obtain completeness.22 If the key idea is to propose a weaker version of Kripke’s system K
without necessitation, it seems very weird that the only modal axiom of this system does not
hold. Besides, both (K) and (M1) are quite natural: the first one says that if an implication
21In [30, Section 5] it was proposed another Ivlev-like non-normal modal sytem characterized by a different
8-valued modal Nmatrix, called K. See more comments below.
22This was the way chosen by [30] when defining their above mentioned 8-valued modal logic. The proposed
system did not only abolish axioms (K) and (M1), but also axiom (K1). It is worth noting that not only (K)
but also (K1) and (M1) are valid in any Kripke model; in particular, they hold in all models whose accessibility
relation is empty.
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is necessary and the antecedent is also necessary, the consequent will be necessary too; the
second one says that if the antecedent of an implication is impossible, the implication will be
necessary.
These are the reasons to withdraw from the axiomatic way (at least from the perspective
of dropping axioms from K), and trying the semantic one. In a relational model in which the
accessibility relation is empty, all atomic formulas are necessary. By (K) we conclude that all
implications will also be necessary, that is, for any formula α and β, the formulas (α→ β) and
¬(α → β) are both true in any world in those models. Analogous to Kripkean semantics, in
our perspective the values I+ and I− must “infect” all the propositional formulas, that means,
they propagate by means of implication as can be verified by the Nmatrix below:
→ T+ C+ F+ I+ T− C− F− I−
T+ {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+} {T−} {C−} {F−} {I−}
C+ {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {I+} {T−} {T−, C−} {C−} {I−}
F+ {T+} {T+} {T+} {I+} {T−} {T−} {T−} {I−}
I+ {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−}
T− {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+} {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+}
C− {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {I+} {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {I+}
F− {T+} {T+} {T+} {I+} {T+} {T+} {T+} {I+}
I− {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+}
Note that if we eliminate the values I+ and I− we obtain exactly the Nmatrices for Dm.
Our task now is to weaken Dm-axiomatic in order to obtain completeness.
Given thatKm extends PC, disjunction and conjunction can be defined as follows: α∨β :=
¬α→ β and α∧ β := ¬(α→ ¬β). As a consequence of this, the corresponding multioperators
are defined as follows:
∨ T+ C+ F+ I+ T− C− F− I−
T+ {T+} {T+} {T+} {I+} {T+} {T+} {T+} {I+}
C+ {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {I+} {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {I+}
F+ {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+} {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+}
I+ {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+}
T− {T+} {T+} {T+} {I+} {T−} {T−} {T−} {I−}
C− {T+} {T+, C+} {C+} {I+} {T−} {T−, C−} {C−} {I−}
F− {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+} {T−} {C−} {F−} {I−}
I− {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−}
∧ T+ C+ F+ I+ T− C− F− I−
T+ {T+} {C+} {F+} {I+} {T−} {C−} {F−} {I−}
C+ {C+} {F+, C+} {F+} {I+} {C−} {F−, C−} {F−} {I−}
F+ {F+} {F+} {F+} {I+} {F−} {F−} {F−} {I−}
I+ {I+} {I+} {I+} {I+} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−}
T− {T−} {C−} {F−} {I−} {T−} {C−} {F−} {I−}
C− {C−} {F−, C−} {F−} {I−} {C−} {F−, C−} {C−} {I−}
F− {F−} {F−} {F−} {I−} {F−} {F−} {F−} {I−}
I− {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−} {I−}
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Notation 4.2. From now on, the following notation for axiom schemas will be adopted: if
(A) is the name of an axiom schema, and α1, . . . , αn is the list of formula schemas involved in
it (reading from left to right), then we will write A(α1, . . . , αn) to refer to the formula schema
labelled by that axiom. By abuse of notation, if α1, . . . , αn are concrete formulas then we will
also write A(α1, . . . , αn) to denote a concrete instance of the formula schema A(α1, . . . , αn)
(when there is no risk of confusion). For instance, given formula schemas α and β then K(α, β)
will denote the formula schema (α → β) → (α → β) of (K), while M3(β, α) will denote
the formula schema ♦β → ♦(α → β) labelled by (M3). Both formula schemas will denote
concrete formulas whenever α and β denote concrete formulas.
Now, consider the following axiom schemas:
(K’) ♦α→ K(α, β)
(K1’) ♦¬β → K1(α, β)
(K2’) ♦α→ K2(α, β)
(M3’) (♦α ∨ ♦¬α)→M3(β, α)
(M4’) ♦¬β →M4(α, β)
(I1) (α ∧¬α)→ ((α→ β) ∧¬(α→ β))
(I2) (β ∧¬β)→ ((α→ β) ∧¬(α→ β))
The system Km is obtained by adding to PC the seven axiom schemas above, together
with axiom schemas (M1), (M2), (DN1) and (DN2).
As usual, if Γ is a set of formulas and α is a formula, Γ ⊢Km α means that there is a
Km-proof of α from formulas in Γ. Besides, Γ Km α means that every Km-valuation that
simultaneously assigns to every formula in Γ an element of +, will also assigns to α an element
of +. This is the usual definition of consequence relation in Nmatrices (recall Definition 2.3).
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness of Km). Let Γ be a set of formulas and let α be a formula. Then
Γ ⊢Km α implies Γ Km α
Proof. We begin by proving that any instance of an axiom schema ofKm is valid in its Nmatrix.
For propositional tautologies, just check that the Nmatrix for Km respects the classical truth-
tables of the operators ¬ and →, by considering + as true and − as false. Namely:
¬
+ −
− +
→ + −
+ + −
− + +
For the modal axioms:
(K’) Suppose, by absurd, that v(K ′(α, β)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. Then v(♦α) ∈ +,
v(α) ∈ +, v((α→ β)) ∈ + but v(β) ∈ −. First, we have that v(α) ∈ (T∪C)∩(T∪I),
hence v(α) ∈ T . Besides, we have that v(α → β) ∈ T ∪ I since v((α → β)) ∈ +. But
v(β) ∈ − implies that v(β) ∈ C ∪ F and so, by definition of the multioperator → in
Km, v(α→ β) ∈ v(α)→ v(β) ⊆ C ∪ F , a contradiction.
(K1’) Suppose now that v(K1′(β, α)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. Hence, v(♦¬β) ∈ +,
v((α → β)) ∈ +, v(♦α) ∈ + but v(♦β) ∈ −. From v(♦¬β) ∈ + it follows that
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v(¬β) ∈ T ∪C, hence v(β) ∈ F ∪C. But v(♦β) ∈ −, then v(β) ∈ F ∪ I. Thus, v(β) ∈ F .
In addition, v(α → β) ∈ T ∪ I and v(α) ∈ T ∪ C. But, by the definition of →, we have
that v(α→ β) ∈ v(α)→ v(β) ⊆ C ∪ F , a contradiction.
(K2’) Consider, by absurd, that v(♦α) ∈ +, v(♦(α→ β)) ∈ +, v(α) ∈ + but v(♦β) ∈ −. As
it was proven in the case for (K), it follows that v(α) ∈ T . Since v(♦(α → β)) ∈ +, we
have that v(α → β) ∈ T ∪ C. From v(♦β) ∈ − it follows that v(β) ∈ F ∪ I. Then, by
the definition of →, v(α→ β) ∈ F ∪ I, a contradiction.
(M3’) Suppose that v(M3′(α, β)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. That is, v(♦α ∨ ♦¬α) ∈ +
but v(M3(β, α)) ∈ −. From the latter, we infer that v(♦β) ∈ + and so v(β) ∈ T ∪ C;
however, we also conclude that v(♦(α → β)) ∈ −, hence v(α → β) ∈ F ∪ I. From this
and the definition of → we get that v(α) ∈ I. But this implies that both v(♦α) ∈ − and
v(♦¬α) ∈ −, and thus v(♦α ∨ ♦¬α) ∈ −, a contradicion.
(M4’) Suppose now that v(M4′(β, α)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. Thus, v(♦¬β) ∈ +,
v(♦¬α) ∈ + but v(♦(α→ β)) ∈ −. As it was proven in the previous cases, it follows that
v(β) ∈ T ∪C and v(α) ∈ T ∪C, but v(α→ β) ⊆ F ∪ I. However, using the definition of
→ it also follows that v(α→ β) ∈ v(α)→ v(β) ⊆ T ∪ C, a contradiction.
(I1) Just note that if v(α ∧ ¬α) ∈ + then both v(α) ∈ + and v(¬α) ∈ +. Hence
v(α) ∈ I. From this, v(α→ β) ∈ I, therefore v((α→ β) ∧¬(α→ β)) ∈ +.
(I2) If v(β ∧¬β) ∈ + then, reasoning as in the case of (I1), v(β) ∈ I. The rest of the proof
is also analogous to the last case.
(DN1)-(DN2) v(α) ∈ + iff v(α) ∈ T ∪ I iff v(¬¬α) ∈ T ∪ I iff v(¬¬α) ∈ +.
In addition, by observing the truth-table for→ over {+,−} displayed above, it follows that
MP preserves trueness, namely: if v(α) ∈ + and v(α → β) ∈ + then v(β) ∈ +, for every
valuation v over the Nmatrix of Km.
Now, assume that Γ ⊢Km α and let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix of Km such that
v(γ) ∈ + for every γ ∈ Γ. Taking into account that any axiom of Km is valid and that MP
preserves trueness, it can be proven by induction on the length of a derivation in Km of α from
Γ that v(α) ∈ +. Therefore Γ Km α.
Theorem 4.4 (Deduction metatheorem (DMT)).
Let Γ be a set of formulas and let both α and β be formulas. Thus:
Γ, α ⊢Km β iff Γ ⊢Km α→ β
Proof. Analogous to [27, p. 28], since Km is an axiomatic extension of PC, hence MP is the
only inference rule.
Definition 4.5. Consider the following relation ≡ defined on For: α ≡ β if and only if both
α→ β and β → α are derivable in Km.
It is easy to see that ≡ is an equivalence relation. It is not a congruence since the connective
 does not preserve logical equivalences, as observed by Omori and Skurt in [30, Observation 72]
for the stronger system Tm (called T by the authors).
Lemma 4.6. Let α be a formula in For. Then, the following holds in Km (recallling that ♦α
is a notation for the formula ¬¬α):
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(i) ♦¬α ≡ ¬α;
(ii) α ≡ ¬♦¬α;
(iii) ¬α ≡ ¬♦α;
(iv) ♦α ≡ ♦¬¬α.
Proof. Analogous to [7, Lemma B].
Lemma 4.7. Let Γ ∪ {α, β} be formulas of formulas in For. Then, the following holds:
(i) α,♦α,♦¬β ⊢Km ♦¬(α→ β)
(ii) ♦α,¬β,♦¬β ⊢ ♦¬(α→ β)
(iii) α,♦α,¬β ⊢Km ¬(α → β)
(iv) ♦α,♦β ⊢Km ♦(α→ β)
(v) ♦¬α,♦β ⊢Km ♦(α→ β)
(vi) ♦¬α,♦¬β ⊢Km ♦(α→ β)
Proof.
(i) By (K’), PC, (DMT) and Lemma 4.6 (i).
(ii) By (K1’), PC, (DMT) and Lemma 4.6 (i) and (iii).
(iii) By (K2’), PC, (DMT) and Lemma 4.6 (iii).
(iv) By (M3’), PC and (DMT).
(v) Analogous to (iv).
(vi) By (M4’), PC and (DMT).
In order to prove completeness, some standard definitions and results form propositional
logic will be recalled now (see, for instance, [34]).
A logic L defined over a L with a consequence relation ⊢L is said to be Tarskian if it satisfies
the following, for every Γ ∪∆ ∪ {α} ⊆ L:
(1) if α ∈ Γ then Γ ⊢L α;
(2) if Γ ⊢L α and Γ ⊆ ∆ then ∆ ⊢L α;
(3) if ∆ ⊢L α and Γ ⊢L β for every β ∈ ∆ then Γ ⊢L α.
A Tarskian logic L is finitary if it satisfies the following property:
(4) if Γ ⊢L α then there exists a finite subset Γ0 of Γ such that Γ0 ⊢L α.
Given a Tarskian logic L over L, let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L. Then Γ is maximal non-trivial w.r.t. ϕ
(or ϕ-saturated) in L if Γ 0L ϕ but Γ, ψ ⊢L ϕ for any ψ 6∈ Γ.
It is easy to see that if Γ is ϕ-saturated then it is closed, that is, the following holds for
every formula ψ: Γ ⊢L ψ iff ψ ∈ Γ.
Theorem 4.8 (Lindenbaum- Los). Let L be a Tarskian and finitary logic over the language L.
Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L be such that Γ 0L ϕ. There exists then a set ∆ such that Γ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ L and ∆
is ϕ-saturated in L.
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Proof. See [34, Theorem 22.2]. Another proof can be found in [5, Theorem 2.2.6].
Since Km is Tarskian and finitary (because it is defined by means of a Hilbert calculus with
MP as the only inference rule, which is finitary) then the last theorem holds for Km.
Definition 4.9. Let ∆ be a set of formulas which is ϕ-saturated in Km. The canonical valua-
tion associated to ∆ is the function V∆ : For −→ {T
+, C+, F+, I+, T−, C−, F−, I−} defined as
follows:
1. V∆(α) ∈ + iff α ∈ ∆
2. V∆(α) ∈ − iff ¬α ∈ ∆
3. V∆(α) ∈ T iff α,♦α ∈ ∆
4. V∆(α) ∈ C iff ♦α,♦¬α ∈ ∆
5. V∆(α) ∈ F iff ¬α,♦¬α ∈ ∆.
6. V∆(α) ∈ I iff α,¬α ∈ ∆.
Given that ∆ is ϕ-saturated in Km then, for any formula α, exactly one formula in the set
{α,¬α} belongs to ∆. This shows, taking into account Lemma 4.6, that V∆ is a well-defined
function.
Lemma 4.10. Let ∆ be a set of formulas which is ϕ-saturated in Km for some formula ϕ, and
let V∆ be the canonical valuation as described in Definition 4.9. Then, V∆ is a Km-valuation.
Proof.
CASE 1: α is ¬β.
(i) If V∆(β) ∈ T , then β,♦β ∈ ∆. By (DN1) it follows that ¬¬β ∈ ∆ and by
Lemma 4.6 (iv), it follows that ♦¬¬β ∈ ∆. Thus, V∆(¬β) ∈ F .
(ii) If V∆(β) ∈ C then ♦β,♦¬β ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.6 (iv), we obtain ♦¬¬β. Thus,
V∆(¬β) ∈ C.
(iii) If V∆(β) ∈ F then ¬β,♦¬β ∈ ∆. Hence V∆(¬β) ∈ T .
(iv) If V∆(β) ∈ I, then β,¬β ∈ ∆. By (DN1) we have ¬¬β ∈ ∆. There-
fore, V∆(¬β) ∈ I.
(v) If V∆(β) ∈ + then β ∈ ∆. By PC, we have ¬¬β ∈ ∆. Thus, V∆(¬β) ∈ −.
(vi) If V∆(β) ∈ −, then ¬β ∈ ∆. Therefore, V∆(¬β) ∈ +.
CASE 2: α is β.
(i) If V∆(β) ∈ T , then β,♦β ∈ ∆ and V∆(β) ∈ +.
(ii) If V∆(β) ∈ C, then ♦β,♦¬β ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.6 (i), ¬β ∈ ∆ and V∆(β) ∈ −.
(iii) If V∆(β) ∈ F , then ¬β,♦¬β ∈ ∆. As above, we have ¬β ∈ ∆ and V∆(β) ∈ −.
(iv) If V∆(β) ∈ I, then β,¬β ∈ ∆ and V∆(β) ∈ +.
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CASE 3: α is β → γ.
(i) Consider that V∆(β) ∈ I. Thus, β,¬β ∈ ∆. Hence, by (I1) and PC, we obtain
(β → γ),¬(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ I.
(ii) Consider now that V∆(γ) ∈ I. Then, γ,¬γ ∈ ∆. Hence, by (I2) and PC, we
have (β → γ),¬(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Thus, V∆(β → γ) ∈ I.
(iii) If V∆(β) ∈ T and V∆(γ) ∈ T , then β,♦β,γ,♦γ ∈ ∆. Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (iv),
♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Furthermore, by (M2), (β → γ) ∈ ∆. Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ T
(iv) Suppose that V∆(β) ∈ T and V∆(γ) ∈ C. Hence, β,♦β,♦γ,♦¬γ ∈ ∆. Thus,
by Lemma 4.7 (iv), ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Besides, by Lemma 4.7 (i), ♦¬(β → γ) ∈ ∆.
Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ C
(v) Suppose now that V∆(β) ∈ T and V∆(γ) ∈ F . Hence, β,♦β,¬γ,♦¬γ ∈ ∆.
Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (ii), ♦¬(β → γ). Furthermore, by Lemma 4.7 (iii), we have
¬(β → γ). Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ F .
(vi) Let V∆(β) ∈ C and V∆(γ) ∈ T . Hence, ♦β,♦¬β,γ,♦γ ∈ ∆. Thus, by (M2),
we obtain (β → γ) ∈ ∆. Besides, by Lemma 4.7 (iv), we have ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆.
Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ T .
(vii) Let now V∆(β) ∈ C and V∆(γ) ∈ C. Thus, ♦β,♦¬β,♦γ,♦¬γ ∈ ∆. Hence, by
Lemma 4.7 (iv), ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ T or V∆(β → γ) ∈ C.
(viii) Suppose now that V∆(β) ∈ C and V∆(γ) ∈ F . Hence, ♦β,♦¬β,¬γ,♦¬γ ∈ ∆.
Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (vi), we have ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. And by Lemma 4.7 (ii), we have
♦¬(β → γ). Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ C.
(ix) Consider now V∆(β) ∈ F and V∆(γ) ∈ T . Thus, ¬β,♦¬β,γ,♦γ ∈ ∆. On
the one hand, by (M2) we have (β → γ) ∈ ∆ . On the other hand, we obtain
♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆, by Lemma 4.7 (v). Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ T .
(x) Let also V∆(β) ∈ F and V∆(γ) ∈ C. Thus, ¬β,♦¬β,♦γ,♦¬γ ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.6 (iii)
and (M1), we have (β → γ) ∈ ∆. Furthermore, by Lemma 4.7 (vi), we obtain
♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Therefore, V∆(β → γ) ∈ T .
(xi) Finally, let V∆(β) ∈ F and V∆(γ) ∈ F . Hence, β,♦¬β,¬γ,♦¬γ ∈ ∆. As above,
by Lemma 4.6 (iii), (M1) and Lemma 4.7 (vi), we conclude that V∆(β → γ) ∈ T .
Corollary 4.11. Let ∆ be a set of formulas which is ϕ-saturated in Km for some formula ϕ.
Then, the funcion V∆ is a Km-valuation such that, for every formula α:
V∆(α) ∈ + iff α ∈ ∆.
Proof. By Definition 4.9, V∆ is a function such that V∆(α) ∈ + iff α ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.10,
V∆ is a Km-valuation.
Theorem 4.12 (Completeness of Km). Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas in For. Then:
Γ Km α implies Γ ⊢Km α.
Proof. Suppose that Γ 0Km α. By Theorem 4.8 there exists a set ∆ of formulas such that
Γ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ is α-saturated in Km. Then, α 6∈ ∆. By Corollary 4.11, V∆ is a Km-valuation
such that V∆(γ) ∈ + for every γ ∈ Γ, but V∆(α) 6∈ +. Therefore Γ 2Km α.
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Corollary 4.13 (Compactness of Nmatrix semantics forKm). Let Γ∪{α} be a set of formulas
in For. If Γ Km α then there exists a finite subset Γ0 of Γ such that Γ0 Km α.
Proof. It is a consequence of Theorems 4.12 and 4.3, and the fact that ⊢Km is finitary.
Let K4m be the system obtained by adding toKm the schema axiom (4). It is very easy to
check that this system is sound and complete with respect to K4m-Nmatrices. For soundness,
we just observe that if v(α) ∈ + then v(α) ∈ {T+, I+} and thus v(α) ∈ +. For
completeness, note that: (i) if V∆(β) ∈ T , then β,♦β ∈ ∆ and then, by (4), β ∈ ∆ and
V∆(β) ∈ {T
+, I+}; if (ii) V∆(β) ∈ I, then β,¬β ∈ ∆ and, once again by (4), β ∈ ∆.
Hence V∆(β) ∈ {T
+, I+} too.
Consider now the K45m system obtained by adding to K4m the schema axiom (5). It is
not difficult to check that this system is sound and complete with respect to K45m-Nmatrices.
For soundness, note that if v(♦α) ∈ + then v(α) ∈ T ∪ C and then v(α) ⊆ T ∪ I, that is,
v(α) ∈ {T+, I+}. For completeness, note that: (i) if V∆(β) ∈ C, then ♦β,♦¬β ∈ ∆. Hence,
by (5) and Lemma 4.6 (i), ¬β,¬β ∈ ∆ and V∆(β) ∈ {F
−, I−}; if (ii) V∆(β) ∈ F , then
¬β,♦¬β ∈ ∆ and, once again by (5) and Lemma 4.6 (i), ¬β,¬β ∈ ∆ and V∆(β) ∈
{F−, I−} too.
5 Recovering a logic inside another
The so-called recovery operators play a fundamental role in the class of paraconsistent logics
known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (in short, LFIs, see for instance [5]). Recall that a
given logic S is an LFI if it is paraconsistent w.r.t. some negation ¬ (that is, there are formulas
α and β such that α,¬α 0S β). In addition, there is a (primitive of defined) unary connective
◦ in S, which is called a consistency operator, such that α,¬α, ◦α ⊢S β for every formula α and
β.23 Given a logic S which is an LFI contained in a presentation of PC in the same signature
of S, then the consistency operator ◦ allows us to recover PC inside S as follows: for every
(finite) set Γ ∪ {α} of formulas,
Γ ⊢PC α iff (∃Υ)[Γ, {◦β : β ∈ Υ} ⊢S α].
The relation stated above is called a Derivability Adjustment Theorem (DAT). The technique
of DATs was originally proposed by D. Batens in the framework of Adaptive logics, but this
idea, together with the notion of consistency operators, was already used by N. da Costa for
his well-known hierarchy of paraconsistent systems called Cn (see [12]). The basic LFI called
mbC has the following axiom (called gently explosion law): ◦α → (α → (¬α → β)). This
axiom, together with the others, guarantees the existence of a DAT between mbC and PC.
Observe that the standard explosion law α→ (¬α→ β) of PC is recovered in mbC by adding
the additional assumption ◦α (namely, ‘α is consistent’). Namely, ◦α ⊢mbC α→ (¬α→ β).
It is worth noting that the system Km was obtained from Dm by weakening some of its
axioms, by using a technique similar to that of LFIs. Specifically, axioms (K), (K1), (K2), (M3)
and (M4) of Dm can only be applied in Km under certain assumptions, such as ♦α or ♦¬β.
This suggest the possibility of defining a formula which plays the role of a recovery operator in
Km with respect to Dm.
Definition 5.1. For any formula α, let ◦α := α→ ♦α be the recovery operator for Km with
respect to Dm.
23This is a slightly simplified version of the definition of LFIs, see [5, Chapter 2].
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Observe that the formula schema ◦α is D(α), the formula schema of the axiom schema (D). It
is also worth noting that the formula ◦α is equivalent to ♦α∨♦¬α in Km. The multioperator
associated to ◦ in the Nmatrix for Km is defined as follows:
◦
T+ +
C+ +
F+ +
I+ −
T− +
C− +
F− +
I− −
That is, ◦α receives a designated truth-value if and only if α receives a value out of I = {I+, I−};
that is, if and only if α receives a truth-value in the Nmatrix for Dm. Boths aspects, namely:
the syntactical one, concerning ◦ as being a recovery operator, and the semantical one, in
which ◦ ‘marks out’ exactly the truth-values in Dm, will be fundamental in order to obtain
a DAT for Km with respect to Dm (see Theorem 5.7 below). If we consider the formula ◦α
as denoting the ‘modal consistency’ of α, then •α := ¬◦α would be a formula denoting the
‘modal inconsistency’ of α. This terminology is suggested by the theory of Logics of Formal
Inconsistency. Observe that •α is equivalent in Km to α ∧¬α, the formula used in axioms
(I1) and (I2). Clearly, the truth-value of •α is designated if and only if the truth-value of α is
in {I+, I−}.
In order to obtain a DAT between Km and Dm, it is necessary to guarantee that ◦α
recovers all the axioms from Dm which were weakened in Km. Recall the notation introduced
in Notation 4.2.
Lemma 5.2. Let α be a formula. Then:
(1) ⊢Km ♦α→ ◦α;
(2) ⊢Km ♦¬α→ ◦α;
(3) ⊢Km (♦α ∨ ♦¬α)→ ◦α;
(4) ⊢Km (◦α→ K(α, β))→ K
′(α, β);
(5) ⊢Km (◦β → K1(α, β))→ K1
′(β, α);
(6) ⊢Km (◦α→ K2(α, β))→ K2
′(α, β);
(7) ⊢Km (◦α→M3(β, α))→ M3
′(α, β);
(8) ⊢Km (◦β →M4(α, β))→M4
′(β, α);
(9) (•α→ •(α→ β)) ≡ I1(α, β);
(10) (•β → •(α→ β)) ≡ I2(β, α).
Proof.
(1)-(3): It follows from the fact that ◦α ≡ (♦α ∨ ♦¬α) and by reasoning in PC.
(4)-(8): It follows from (1)-(3) and by reasoning in PC.
(9)-(10): It follows from the fact that •α ≡ (α ∧¬α) and by reasoning in PC.
Let Km◦ be the system obtained from Km by replacing the axiom schemas (K’), (K1’),
(K2’), (M3’), (M4’), (I1) and (I2) by the following seven axiom schemas:
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(K”) ◦α→ K(α, β)
(K1”) ◦β → K1(α, β)
(K2”) ◦α→ K2(α, β)
(M3”) ◦α→ M3(β, α)
(M4”) ◦β → M4(α, β)
(I1’) •α→ •(α→ β)
(I2’) •β → •(α→ β)
Proposition 5.3. The systems Km and Km◦ coincide, that is: Γ ⊢Km α iff Γ ⊢Km◦ α for
every Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ For.
Proof. By Lemma 5.2 (4)-(10) it follows that Km◦ is stronger than Km, that is: if Γ ⊢Km α
then Γ ⊢Km◦ α. Conversely, by adapting the proof of Theorem 4.3 it follows that every axiom
in Km◦ is valid in the Nmatrix of Km. By completeness of Km, all these axioms are derivable
in Km. Hence, Γ ⊢Km◦ α implies that Γ ⊢Km α.
Remark 5.4. The latter result clearly shows that Km can be seen as a weak version of
Dm in which some axioms (or principles) are weakened and controlled by means of a modal
consistency recovery operator ◦, such that the corresponding modal inconsistency operator •
satisfies certain propagation properties (described by axioms (I1’) and (I2’)). This is analogous
to the case of LFIs, as explained above. Observe that (I1’) and (I2’) are equivalent in Km to
(I1”) ◦(α→ β)→ ◦α
(I2”) ◦(α→ β)→ ◦β
which are properties of retropropagation of the modal consistency operator ◦.
Now, a simple but relevant technical result concerning Nmatrices will be stated. Recall
from [8] the notion of submultialgebra. It states that a multialgebra A is a submultialgebra of
another B, denoted by A ⊆sm B provided that: both are defined over the same signature; the
domain A of A is contained in the domain B of B; and cA(~a) ⊆ cB(~a) for every n-ary connective
c and any ~a ∈ An. Here, cA and cB denote the multioperations associated to the connective c
in A and B, respectively.
Proposition 5.5. Let ATm, ADm and AKm be the multialgebras underlying the Nmatrices
MTm, MDm and MKm for the logics Tm, Dm and Km, respectively. Then, the following
holds: ATm ⊆sm ADm ⊆sm AKm.
Proof. If follows by mere inspection of the multioperations for each logic.
Corollary 5.6. Let ATm, ADm and AKm be the domains of the Nmatrices MTm, MDm and
MKm for the logics Tm, Dm and Km, respectively.
1) Let v ve a valuation in MTm, and let v1 : For → ADm and v2 : For → AKm be the functions
given by v1(α) = v2(α) = v(α), for every formula α. Then v1 and v2 are valuations in MDm
and MKm, respectively.
2) Let v ve a valuation inMDm, and let v1 : For → AKm be the function given by v1(α) = v(α),
for every formula α. Then v1 is a valuation in MKm.
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Proof. It is immediate from the definition of valuation over an Nmatrix, and from Proposi-
tion 5.5.
Theorem 5.7 (DAT between Km and Dm). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ For be a set of formulas. Then:
Γ ⊢Dm ϕ iff (∃Υ)[Γ, {◦δ : δ ∈ Υ} ⊢Km ϕ].
Proof. (‘Only if ’ part) We begin by proving the following (recalling Notation 4.2):
Fact 1: Let (A) ∈ {(K), (K2)}. Then ◦α ⊢Km A(α, β) for every formula α, β.
Indeed, suppose that (A) is (K). By Proposition 5.3 the instance ◦α → K(α, β) of axiom (K”)
is derivable in Km. Let α1 . . . αn = ◦α → K(α, β) be a derivation of that formula in Km.
Consider the following derivation in Km:
1. ◦α (hyp)
2. α1
...
n+ 1. αn = ◦α→ K(α, β)
n+ 2. K(α, β) (MP 1, n+ 1)
The above derivation shows that ◦α ⊢Km K(α, β). The proof for axiom (K2) is similar, but
now by using axiom (K2”).
Fact 2: Let (A) ∈ {(K1), (M4)}. Then ◦β ⊢Km A(α, β) for every formula α, β.
The proof of Fact 2 is analogous to the one given for Fact 1, but now by using axioms (K1”)
and (M4”).
Fact 3: ◦α ⊢Km M3(β, α) for every formula α, β.
The proof of Fact 3 is similar to that for Fact 1, but now by using axiom (M3”).
Now, suppose that Γ ⊢Dm ϕ. Then, there is a finite sequence of formulas α1 · · ·αn such that
αn = ϕ and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either αi ∈ Γ, or αi is an instance of an axiom of Dm, or there
are j, k < i such that αi is obtained from αj and αk by MP. In case that every instance of an
axiom used in such derivation corresponds to axioms of Km, then Γ ⊢Km ϕ and so it suffices
to take Υ = ∅. Otherwise, let αi be a formula in the derivation above which was included only
because it is an instance of an axiom (A) in Dm, and assume that (A) is not an axiom in Km.
That occurrence of αi can be replaced in the sequence α1 · · ·αn by: either an occurrence of ◦α
(which is αi) as an additional hypothesis, if (A) is (D); or by a derivation of αi in Km from
the additional hypothesis ◦α or ◦β as described in the proofs of Fact 1-Fact 3, otherwise. Let
Υ be the set of formulas δ such that ◦δ was added as an additional hypothesis by the method
described above. Then, the sequence of formulas β1 · · ·βm obtained from α1 · · ·αn by means of
this process constitutes a derivation in Km of ϕ from Γ ∪ {◦δ : δ ∈ Υ}.
(‘If ’ part) Suppose that Γ, {◦δ : δ ∈ Υ} ⊢Km ϕ for some set Υ of formulas, and let v be
a valuation in the Nmatrix MDm for Dm such that v(γ) is designated, for every γ ∈ Γ. By
Corollary 5.6(2), the function v1 : For → AKm given by v1(α) = v(α) for every α is a valuation
in MKm. Moreover, v1(γ) is designated in MKm for every γ ∈ Γ∪ {◦δ : δ ∈ Υ}. This follows
from the fact that v1(γ) ∈ ADm for every γ and by the definition of the multioperator associated
to ◦, as observed above. By hypothesis, and by soundness of Km, v1(ϕ) is designated inMKm
and so, by definition of v1 and ofMDm, v(ϕ) is designated inMDm. This shows that Γ |=Dm ϕ.
Thus, Γ ⊢Dm ϕ by completeness of Km (see Theorem 4.12).
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Now, consider the formula schema ◦′α := (α→ α)∧ (¬α→ ¬α) (recalling that β ∧ γ is
a notation for ¬(β → ¬γ)). With the notation for axioms stated in Notation 4.2, it follows that
◦′α corresponds to T (α) ∧ T (¬α), where T is the formula schema of axiom (T). In addition,
observe that, in ADm, ◦
′x = {T−, C−} if x ∈ {F+, T−}, and ◦′x = + otherwise. That is, v(◦′α)
is a designated value in MDm iff v(α) is a value in ATm, for every valuation v for MDm. This
being so, and by a technique analogous to that used in the proof of Theorem 5.7, the following
DATs can be easily proved:
Theorem 5.8 (DAT between Dm and Tm). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ For be a finite set of formulas.
Then:
Γ ⊢Tm ϕ iff (∃Υ)[Γ, {◦
′γ : γ ∈ Υ} ⊢Dm ϕ].
Theorem 5.9 (DAT between Km and Tm). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ For be a finite set of formulas.
Then:
Γ ⊢Tm ϕ iff (∃Υ,Υ
′)[Γ, {◦δ : δ ∈ Υ}, {◦′γ : γ ∈ Υ′} ⊢Km ϕ].
6 A deterministic implication
In 1996, M. Baaz expanded the infinite-valued Go¨del logic with an unary operator called ∆
defined as follows: ∆(1) = 1, and ∆(x) = 0 otherwise (see [3]). The (dual of the) same
operator was already considered by A. Monteiro, inspired by an example given in 1963 by
L. Monteiro [28], to consider in 1978 the variety TMA of tetravalent modal algebras, which
expand the De Morgan algebras. This is why this kind of operator is now called Monteiro-Baaz
∆ operator. In the context of fuzzy logic, P. Ha´jeck considered BL∆, the expansion of the
basic fuzzy logic BL by the ∆ operator, whose axioms concerning ∆ are the following (see [18,
Chapter 2]):
(∆1) ∆α ∨ ¬∆α
(∆2) ∆(α ∨ β)→ (∆α ∨∆β)
(∆3) ∆α→ α
(∆4) ∆α→ ∆∆α
(∆5) ∆(α→ β)→ (∆α→ ∆β)
besides the Generalization inference rule, analogous to necessitation rule in normal modal sys-
tems. As observed by Ha´jeck, the ∆ operator is a kind of mixed modality which satisfies
properties of an (alethic) necessity operator, as well as a property, namely axiom (∆2), of a
possibility operator.
In this section, we will consider → as a completely deterministic multioperator, under the
perspective of interpreting  as a kind of (non-deterministic) ∆ operator. Because of axiom
(∆3), it is natural of start with system Tm. Given that α∨¬α is equivalent in Tm to α→ α,
then  satisfies axiom (∆1). In addition, axiom (∆5) corresponds to axiom (K), which is
valid in Tm. However, neither (∆2) nor (∆4) are valid in Tm. Clearly (∆4) corresponds to
axiom (4), hence the  operator together with the implication from system T4m satisfy all
the properties of a ∆ operator, with the exception of (∆2).
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In order to satisfy axiom (∆2), recall that α∨ β := ¬α→ β. This being so, the implication
should be deterministic in such a way that the induced disjunction becomes the join (maximum)
operator in the chain F− ≤ C− ≤ C+ ≤ T+. Namely,
→ T+ C+ C− F−
T+ T+ C+ C− F−
C+ T+ C+ C− C−
C− T+ C+ C+ C+
C− T+ T+ T+ T+
∨ T+ C+ C− F−
T+ T+ T+ T+ T+
C+ T+ C+ C+ C+
C− T+ C+ C− C−
C− T+ C+ C− F−
The Nmatrix obtained from the one for Tm by changing the original multiperator for → by
the (deterministic) operator above was already considered by Ivlev under the name of Sa¯. He
proposes the following additional axiom to characterize this system:
(Kdet) (α→ β)→ (♦α→ β)
Definition 6.1. Let Tmd be the Hilbert calculus obtained from Tm by changing axiom (K1)
by (Kdet).24
Proposition 6.2. Axiom (K1) is derivable in Tmd.
Proof. It follows form the fact that the schema α→ ♦α is derivable inPC∪{(T), (DN1), (DN2)}
(see [7]).
From the last result, it follows that Tmd is equivalent to adding axiom (Kdet) to Tm.
Theorem 6.3. System Tmd is sound and complete w.r.t. the Nmatrix for Tm in which the
original multiperator for → is replaced by the deterministic operator of the truth-table above.25
Proof. For soundness, it worth noting that the Nmatrix for Tmd restrains the Nmatrix for Tm.
This means that any valuation over the Nmatrix for Tmd is a valuation over the Nmatrix for
Tm. Hence, for Tm-soundness proved in [6] and [7], we have to check only the axiom (Kdet).
Thus, let α, β ∈ For and let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix for Tmd such that v((α→ β))
and v(♦α) are designated. Then v(α→ β) = T+ and v(α) 6= F−. Thus, v(β) = T+ and (vβ)
is designated. We conclude that v(Kdet) is designated too.
For completeness, note that Lemma 4.6 holds good for Tmd. We have to make some
adjustment in the proof of [6, Lemma 4] by changing, for instance, the values tn, tc, f c and f i
by T+, C+,C− and F−, respectively. In addition, ∆ is now an α-saturated set containing Γ
such that Γ 0Tmd α. Other adjustment that must be made is to eliminate the rule (DN), what
is was done in [7]. Now, three new cases must be considered:
(i) If V∆(β) = C
− and V∆(γ) = C
+, then ♦β,♦¬γ,¬β, γ ∈ ∆. If (β → γ) ∈ ∆, by (Kdet)
and Lemma 4.6 (i) we would have γ,¬γ ∈ ∆ and ∆ would be inconsistent, an absurd.
By PC, Lemma 4.6 (i) and the fact that ∆ is α-saturated, we have that V∆(β → γ) = C
+.
(ii) If V∆(γ) = V∆(β) = C
−, then ♦β,♦γ,¬β,¬γ ∈ ∆. If (β → γ) ∈ ∆, by (Kdet) and
(T) we would have γ ∈ ∆ and ∆ would be inconsistent. By the same reasons, we have
V∆(β → γ) = C
+.
24The letter ‘d’ stands for ‘deterministic implication/disjunction’.
25That is, the Nmatrix of Ivlev’s Sa¯. See [19].
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(iii) If V∆(γ) = V∆(β) = C
+, then ♦¬β,♦¬γ, β, γ ∈ ∆. Suppose (β → γ) ∈ ∆. If ¬♦β ∈ ∆,
by Lemma 4.6 (iii) and (T), we would have ¬β ∈ ∆ and ∆ would be inconsistent, an
absurd. Thus ♦β ∈ ∆. In this case, by (Kdet) and Lemma 4.6 (i), we will have γ ∈ ∆.
Again, by the same reasons as above, we conclude that V∆(β → γ) = C
+.
It is easy to see that axiom (∆2) holds in Tmd, hence it satisfies all the axioms for a ∆
operator with the exception of axiom (∆4). This justifies the definition of the following system:
Definition 6.4. Let Tm4d be the Hilbert calculus obtained from Tmd by adding schema axiom
(4). Equivalently, Tm4d is obtained from Tm4 by changing axiom (K1) by (Kdet).
Theorem 6.5. System Tm4d is sound and complete w.r.t. the Nmatrix for T4m in which
the original multiperator for → is replaced by the deterministic operator → .
Proof. We just have to add in Theorem 6.3 the case when α = β. This case, in fact, was
checked in [6, Theorem 17].
Clearly, the logic Tm4d satisfies all the axioms for a ∆ operator. This being so,  is a kind
of non-deterministic ∆ operator, in which the necessation rule does not hold. It is worth noting
that  is the only non-deterministic connective of Tm4d. This means that the extension
of Tm4d obtained by adding schema axiom (5), namely, the system Tm45d, is a system
characterized by a standard logical matrix, since  is also deterministic. By re-interpreting its
truth-values T+, C+, C−, F− as 1, 2/3, 1/3 and 0, respectively, and by observing that → and
∨ are inter-definable in Tm4d (hence in Tm45d), the logical matrix of Tm45d corresponds
to the {¬,∨}-fragment of 4-valued  Lukasiewicz logic  L4 expanded with this operator simular
(but weaker) to Monteiro-Baaz ∆, and in which {1, 2/3} are designated. As we shall see in the
next section, Tm45d is the only modal system presented in this paper which is characterizable
by a single finite deterministic matrix.
7 The inevitability of non-determinism
In 1940, Dugundji showed that no modal system between S1 and S5 can be characterized by a
single finite logical matrix. Since then, several generalizations of that theorem were obtained,
showing that practically no modal system considered in the literature can be characterized by
a single finite logical matrix. On the other hand, each of the systems considered in this paper
(with exception of Tm45d, mentioned at the end of the previous section) is characterized by a
single finite-valued non-deterministic matrix. A natural question is to determine whether non-
deterministic matrices are intrinsically necessary in order to characterize such systems, or if its
possible to characterize (some of) them by means of a single finite (ordinary) logical matrix.
The aim of this section is showing that the above question has a negative answer. Indeed,
two Dugundji-like theorems will be obtained (Theorems 7.4 and 7.8), proving that none of the
systems considered in the previous sections (with exception of Tm45d) can be characterized
by a a single finite logical matrix. These results justify the use of non-deterministic matrices
as a semantic tool for dealing with them.
To begin with, some notation will be introduced. If Γ = {α1, . . . , αn} is a finite family of n
formulas in For, with n ≥ 2, then
∨
Γ will denote the formula ((. . . ((α1∨α2)∨α3)∨ . . .)∨αn).
Definition 7.1. Let n ≥ 3 be a natural number, and let p1, . . . pn be n different propositional
variables. We define the following formula schema:
δ(n) =
∨
{(α(n)→ βi(n)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
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where α(n) =
∨
{pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} and βi(n) =
∨
{pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i} for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For instance, if n = 3 then:
δ(3) =
(
(((p1 ∨ p2) ∨ p3)→ (p2 ∨ p3))∨
(((p1 ∨ p2) ∨ p3)→ (p1 ∨ p3))
)
∨
(((p1 ∨ p2) ∨ p3)→ (p1 ∨ p2)).
Proposition 7.2. Let M = 〈M,D〉 be a deterministic logical matrix such that M has n
elements, and M is a model of Km. Then, M validates the formula δ(n+ 1).
Proof. Let M = 〈M,D〉 be an n-valued logical matrix which is a model of Km, and let h be a
valuation over M. Since M has just n values, there exists 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n+ 1 such that i 6= k but
h(pi) = h(pk). From this, h(α(n+1)) = h(βi(n+1)) since h is a valuation over a logical matrix,
and h(pi) = h(pk) by hypotesis (therefore, when evaluating h(βi(n + 1)) the “missing” value
h(pi) is retrieved with h(pk)). Using once again the fact that h is a valuation over a logical
matrix, it follows that h(α(n+ 1)) = h(α(n+ 1)) = h(βi(n+ 1)) = h(βi(n+ 1)). Thus,
h(α(n+ 1)→ βi(n+ 1)) = h(α(n+ 1))→ h(βi(n+ 1)) belongs to D, given that β → β
is a theorem of Km for every formula β. Using that β → (β ∨γ) and γ → (β ∨γ) are theorems
of Km for every formula β and γ, it follows that h(β → (β ∨ γ)) ∈ D and h(γ → (β ∨ γ)) ∈ D.
Hence, h(δ(n + 1)) ∈ D. Since the latter holds for every valuation h, the result follows.
Proposition 7.3. The formula δ(n) is not a theorem of T45m, for every n ≥ 3.
Proof. Let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix for T45m such that v(pj) = C
+ for every
1 ≤ j ≤ n; v(α(n)) = T+, and v(βi(n)) = C
+ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n (note that this is always
possible, from the definition of the Nmatrix for T45m). From this, v(α(n)) is designated but
v(βi(n)) is not, for every i. This being so, v((α(n)→ βi(n)) is not designated, for every i,
hence v(δ(n)) is not designated. This means that δ(n)) is not a valid formula for the Nmatrix
for T45m and so, by soundness, it is not a theorem of T45m.
Now, the first theorem of uncharacterizability by finite matrices is obtained:
Theorem 7.4. No system between Km and T45m can be characterized by a single finite
deterministic logical matrix.
Proof. Suppose, by absurd, that a system S lying between Km and T45m can be semantically
characterized by a finite logical matrix M with n elements. It is worth noting that n ≥ 2.
Indeed, if n = 1 then S would be the trivial logic and so it could not be contained in T45m.
Since M is a model of Km then M validates the formula δ(n + 1), by Proposition 7.2.
Given that S is complete w.r.t. M, the formula δ(n + 1) is a theorem of S and so it is a
theorem of T45m. But this contradicts Proposition 7.3. Therefore, S cannot be characterized
by a single finite logical matrix.
The second theorem of uncharacterizability by finite matrices is obtained for the systems Tmd
and T4md introduced in Section 6, in which the implication is deterministic. Firstly, some
previous result are necessary:
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Definition 7.5. Let n ≥ 3 be a natural number, and let p1, . . . pn be n different propositional
variables. We define the following formula schema:
γ(n) =
∨
{(¬α(n)→ ¬βi(n)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
where α(n) =
∨
{pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} and βi(n) =
∨
{pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i} for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proposition 7.6. Let S ∈ {Tmd,T4md}. Let M = 〈M,D〉 be a (deterministic) logical
matrix such that M has n elements, and M is a model of S. Then, M validates the formula
γ(n + 1).
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Proposition 7.2.
Proposition 7.7. Let S ∈ {Tmd,T4md}. Then, the formula γ(n) is not a theorem of S, for
every n ≥ 3.
Proof. Let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix for S such that v(pj) = C
+ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Then, v(α(n)) = v(βi(n)) = C
+ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since the disjunction is deterministic. Now,
assume that v(α(n)) = F− and v(βi(n)) = C
−, for every i (note that this is always possible,
from the definition of the multioperator  of the Nmatrix for S). From this, v(¬α(n)) = T+
and v(βi(n)) = C
+, for every i. This being so, v(¬α(n)) is designated but v(¬βi(n))
is not. Hence, v((¬α(n)→ ¬βi(n)) is not designated, for every i, and so v(γ(n)) is not
designated. From this, γ(n)) is not a valid formula for the Nmatrix for S and so, by soundness,
it is not a theorem of S.
Theorem 7.8. Let S ∈ {Tmd,T4md}. Then, S cannot be characterized by a single finite
deterministic logical matrix.
Proof. Suppose, by absurd, that S can be semantically characterized by a finite logical matrix
M with n elements. As in the proof of Theorem 7.4 it follows that n ≥ 2.
By Proposition 7.6 it follows that M validates the formula γ(n + 1). Given that S is
complete w.r.t. M, the formula γ(n+1) is a theorem of S. But this contradicts Proposition 7.7.
Therefore, S cannot be characterized by a single finite logical matrix.
Finally, it will be shown that all the modal systems introduced above are conservative extensions
of classical propositional logic PC:
Proposition 7.9. Every system S between Km and T45m is a conservative extension of
classical propositional logic PC. That is, given a formula α over the signature {¬,→}, α is
valid in S iff α is valid in PC.
Proof. Given that S is an extension of PC, it follows that any valid formula of PC is valid in
S. Now, suppose that α is not valid in PC. Then, there is a 2-valued classical valuation v such
that v(α) = 0. It is clear that the 2-valued Boolean algebra for PC can be defined with domain
{T+, F−} such that T+ corresponds to 1 and F− corresponds to 0. Moreover, this algebra, seen
as a multialgebra, is a submultialgebra of the Nmatrix of T45m, and its designated truth-value
is also designated in T45m. From this, the valuation v can be seen as a valuation v¯ over the
Nmatrix of T45m such that v¯(β) is designated iff v(β) = 1, for every formula β. Thus, the
formula α is not valid in T45m, whence it is not valid in S.
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Although we have presented an interpretation for Ivlev’s semantics, we do not want to argue that
the Nmatrices presented here for negation and for modal operators better capture the natural
language use of negation, implication and modal operators. There are many possibilities for
defining these operators such that all the resulting systems are (conservative) extensions of
classical logic. We have presented here only a few of them that already exist in the literature,
and that seemed reasonable enough.
From our previous discussion and from the results obtained here, we believe that there are
good reasons to deal with modal logics without any introduction rule for modal operators like
the necessitation rule. The absence of any modal inference rule allows us to consider a radical
distinction between a formula being tautology and being necessary, in a similar way that Kripke
semantics radically separates the notions between being necessary and being a priori.
We also believe that non-deterministic semantics has a promising future in several fields of
logic, in particular, modal logic. In the case of propositional modal logic in alethic contexts,
they could solve paradoxes that are formulated by the use of the necessitation rule, such as
Fitch’s paradox, for example. In deontic contexts, systems weaker than D could solve deontic
paradoxes, like Chisholm’s paradox.
There are many technical results to be explored in this field. Lemmon and Scott have
proved in [26] a generalized result of completeness through Kripke semantics.26 Let n and ♦n
be denoting n-iterations of those operators. Given an axiom schema of the form
♦klα→m ♦nα
for some fixed natural numbers k, l, m, n, it is possible to obtain an accessibility property
between the worlds so that the class of models having this property will characterize the system
obtained by adding to K the given axiom schema.
An analogous result could be obtained by means of non-deterministic semantics. By varying
the number of truth-values chosen by the multioperator interpreting the  connective (while
keeping fixed the multioperators for negation and implication), we have a finite number of
submultialgebras between Tm and T45m. In fact, there are 24 = 16 possible multioperators
for the modal connective, hence 16 multialgebras can be defined as stipulated above. There are,
therefore, 14 systems between Tm and T45m. The problem here is how to obtain an axiom
schema such that, added to Tm, produces completeness. The same could be done for the
other connectives by considering, for example, only those Nnmatrices that extend the classical
propositional logic. The previous arguments could also be applied to Dm and Km.
In another line of research, the generalization of modal Nmatrices to swap structures se-
mantics proposed in [9] opens interesting possibilities for Ivlev-like modal systems with respect
to algebraizability in a wide sense (see [8]). Thus, it would be interesting the study of the
modal systems proposed here and the ones analyzed in [10] from the broader perspective of
swap structures.
Finally, another kind of non-deterministic semantics could be applied to Ivlev-like modal
systems. For instance, Fidel structures (a.k.a. F-structures) could be defined for some of these
systems. F-structures were originally proposed by M. Fidel in 1977 for da Costa’s paraconsistent
systems Cn (see [16]), proving for the first time the decidability of such systems. The possible-
translations semantics introduced by W. Carnielli in [4] could also we applied to this kind of
modal systems. More details about non-deterministic semantics and their relationships can be
found in [5, Chapter 6].
We believe that the considerations above show the legitimacy, the importance and the
promising future of non-deterministic semantics applied to propositional modal logic. The
26These results were generalized by H. Sahlqvist in [32], by covering a wider class of axiom types.
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generalization of this framework to first-order logics is the subject of a forthcoming paper.
9 Acknowledgements
This research was partially supported by the Centre International de Mathe´matiques et d’Informatique
de Toulouse (CIMI) through contract ANR-11-LABEX-0040-CIMI within the program ANR-
11-IDEX-0002-02. Coniglio acknowledges support from CNPq (Brazil), individual research
grant number 308524/2014-4. Peron was partially supported by FAPESC (Brazil), process
number FAPESC771/2016.
References
[1] A. Avron and I. Lev. Canonical propositional Gentzen-type systems. In Proceedings of
the First International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR ’01), pages
529–544, London, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[2] A. Avron and A. Zamansky. Non-deterministic semantics for logical systems. Handbook
of Philosophical Logic, 16:227–304, 2011.
[3] M. Baaz. Infinite-valued Go¨del logics with 0-1-projections and relativizations. In P. Ha´jek,
editor, Go¨del ’96: Logical foundations of mathematics, computer science and physics, vol-
ume 6 of Lecture Notes in Logic, pages 23–33, Berlin, 1996. Springer-Verlag.
[4] W. A. Carnielli. Many-valued logics and plausible reasoning. In G. Epstein, editor, Pro-
ceedings of the Twentieth International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic, Charlotte,
NC, USA, pages 328–335. The IEEE Computer Society Press, 1990.
[5] W. A. Carnielli and M. E. Coniglio. Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency, contradiction and
negation, volume 40 of Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Springer, 2016.
[6] M. E. Coniglio, L. Farin˜as del Cerro, and N.M. Peron. Finite non-deterministic semantics
for some modal systems. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 25(1):20–45, 2015.
[7] M. E. Coniglio, L. Farin˜as del Cerro, and N.M. Peron. Errata and addenda to finite non-
deterministic semantics for some modal systems. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics,
26(1):1–10, 2017.
[8] M. E. Coniglio, A. Figallo-Orellano, and A. C. Golzio. Non-deterministic algebraization of
logics by swap structures. Logic Journal of the IGPL, to appear, 2018. Preprint available
at arXiv:1708.08499 [math.LO], 2017.
[9] M. E. Coniglio and A. C. Golzio. Swap structures semantics for Ivlev-like modal logics.
Soft Computing, to appear, 2018.
[10] M. E. Coniglio and N. M. Peron. Dugundji’s theorem revisited. Logica Universalis, 8(3-
4):407–422, 2014.
[11] M. J. Creswell and G. E. Hughes. A New Introduction to Modal Logic. Routledge, London
and New York, 1996.
[12] N. C. A. da Costa. Sistemas formais inconsistentes (Inconsistent formal systems, in Por-
tuguese). Habilitation thesis, Universidade Federal do Parana´, Curitiba, Brazil, 1963.
Republished by Editora UFPR, Curitiba, Brazil,1993.
9 Acknowledgements 31
[13] W. Demopoulous and Clark P. The logicism of Frege, Russell and Dedekind. In S. Shapiro,
editor, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford Handbooks
in Philosophy, pages 129–165, USA, 2005. Oxford University Press.
[14] R. Descartes. Me´ditations me´taphysiques. GF Flammarion, 2011. English translation by
M. Moriarty in: R. Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy. Oxford Worlds Classics.
Oxford University Pres, 2008.
[15] J. Dugundji. Note on a property of matrices for Lewis and Langford’s calculi of proposi-
tions. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5(4):150–151, 1940.
[16] M. M. Fidel. The decidability of the calculi Cn. Reports on Mathematical Logic, 8:31–40,
1977.
[17] M. Gueroult. Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, volume 1. L’ame et Dieu. Aubier Mon-
taigne, 1968. English translation by R. Ariew in: M. Gueroult. Descartes Philosophy
Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons, Vol. 1, The Soul and God. University of
Minnesota Press, 1984.
[18] P. Ha´jek.Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic, volume 4 of Trends in Logic. Kluwer, Dordrecht,
1998.
[19] J. V. Ivlev. A semantics for modal calculi. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 17(3/4):114–121,
1988.
[20] I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason (Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer & Allen W.
Wood). The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[21] R. Kant, I.; Meerbote. Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come
forward as science. In D. Walford, editor, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, The Cam-
bridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Cambridge, 1992. Cambridge University
Press. Translated by G. Hatfield.
[22] S. A. Kripke. Semantic analysis of modal logic I. Normal propositional calculi. Zeitschrift
fu¨r mathemathische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 9:67–96, 1963.
[23] S. A. Kripke. Semantical analysis of modal logic II. Non-normal modal propositional
calculi. In J. W. Addison, A. Tarski, and L. Henkin, editors, The Theory of Models, pages
206–220, Amsterdam, 1966. North-Holland.
[24] S. A. Kripke. Naming and Necessity. Library of Philosophy & Logic. Blackwell Publishers,
1981.
[25] E. J. Lemmon. Algebraic semantics for modal logics I. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
31(1):44–65, 1966.
[26] E. J. Lemmon and D. S. Scott. The Lemmon Notes: An Introduction to Modal Logic.
Blackwell, 1977.
[27] E. Mendelson. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Discrete Mathematics and Its Appli-
cations. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 5 edition, 2010.
[28] L. Monteiro. Axiomes inde´pendants pour les alge`bres de  Lukasiewicz trivalentes. Bulletin
de la Societe´ des Sciences Mathe´matiques et Physiques de la R. P. Roumanie, Nouvelle
se´rie, 7:199–202, 1963.
9 Acknowledgements 32
[29] H. Noonan. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kripke and Naming and Necessity. Rout-
ledge Philosophy GuideBooks. Routledge, 2013.
[30] H. Omori and D. Skurt. More modal semantics without possible worlds. IfCoLog Journal
of Logics and their Applications, 3(5):815–846, 2016.
[31] B. Russell. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Routledge Classics). Routledge, 2010.
[32] H. Sahlqvist. Completeness and correspondence in first and second order semantics for
modal logic. In S. Kanger, editor, Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium,
pages 110–143, Amsterdam, 1975. North Holland.
[33] K. K. Segerberg. An essay in Classical Modal Logic. PhD thesis, Stanford University,
Stanford, 1971.
[34] R. Wo´jcicki. Lectures on propositional calculi. Ossolineum, Wroclaw, Poland, 1984.
